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3INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to examine the effects of bargaining councils on the labour market in
South Africa. TIl..: contention is that bargaining councils through the use of extensions introduc e
rigidities into the South African labour market. These rigidities distort the labour market and
increase the level of unemployment.
The bargaining council system emanates from the Labour Relations Act of 1956. These agreements
stipulate the regulations as regards the conditions of employment, wage levels, pensions and
administration of labour. The purpose of their establishment was the regulation of the labour market
to provide labour security for white insiders. Only since 1979 have black trade unions been
recognized and incorporated into the bargaining council system. This eroded the power of the white
unions. The result was that protection became a covered-uncovered worker issue and is achieved by
virtue of the ability to extend the council agreements to an entire industry. I will argue that unions
and the larger firms (that can afford to be involved in the negotiations) negotiate agreements that are
in their own interests and then the agreements are extended to the rest of the industry. Thus the
agreements and the terms thereof become legally enforceable. Thus the bargaining councils create a
forum from which these select parties can create an environment favourable to their own interests.
The paper is divided into five chapters. The first chapter presents a theoretical analysis of the effects
of bargaining councils in the South African labour market. I present two sides, the neo-classical
(Moll) and the structuralist (ILO Report and the Labour Market Commission Report) viewpoints.
These two are seen as opposing views of the labour market as well as regards solutions to the
problem of unemployment. Both these models provide useful insight into the South African labour
market and the effects of bargaining councils. The model presented by Moll focuses on the effect of
the extensions of bargaining council agreements on the cost structures of firms. He finds that there
is a difference in the cost structure between large and small firms. Large firms that are more capital
intensive tend to incur higher labour costs than the smaller more labour intensive firms. Thus his
contention is that the extensions of agreements increases the labour costs of smaller firms and
decreases them for larger firms. This put pressure on the smaller firms and results in some of them
closing down. Moll sees this from the point of view that larger firms that are party to bargaining
council negotiations purposefully create these conditions to form barriers to entry. Furthermore, the
unions also achieve the.r objective of increasing wage levels for members. The union behaviour is
best explained by insider-outsider theory where the wage differentials created are between covered
4and uncovered sectors. From this standpoint Moll calls for the deregulation of the labour market,
i.e, the dismantling of the bargaining council system.
The structuralist approach sees the labour market in terms of the conflict between labour and
business. The conflict arises cut of the differing needs for security (labour) and flexibility
(business). Security for workers is in terms of job security and income security whereas flexibility
for firms !s the ability to alter the number of workers it employs in response to changes in the
conditions. These two needs are opposing, as more security is associated with less flexibility and
vice versa. Given this characterization ofthe labour market the structuralist approach is opposed to
the deregulation of the labour market and the reduction in the wage levels. They see the wage issue
as being related to productivity in terms of an efficiency wage argument. A decrease in wages will
lead to a decrease in productivity, so in order to reduce unit labour costs they prescribe that efforts
should be directed at increasing productivity and skill levels. This is to be achieved through
intervention into the labour market and one of the primary Wf:}YS is through bargaining councils.
These two models provide crucial characterizations of the labour market that ere important f01 this
paper. The neo-classical model's characterization of the different cost structures of different firms
and the objectives of the parties to the bargaining council negotiation process is crucial. However, it
becomes evident at a later stage that the concentration of this model on the effects of wages is
inadequate. It comes to light that it is not the level of wages that affects the firm's decision about
the number of workers that it employs. The structuralist model's contention as to the existence of
efficiency wages in the South African labour market is very important as this explains the level of
wages prevalent in the market. It also implies that the deregulation will not affect the wage level,
rather the wage levels are consistent with premiums being paid to skilled employees. The premiums
are a result of the skill shortage in South Africa at present. This implies that the rigidities present are
not a result of wage levels.
The second chapter examines the development of the bargaining council system. This system finds
its origins in the apartheid labour market. This highlights the institutional background as well as the
objectives that underlie the bargaining council system. These objectives include selectivity, duality
and control. This chapter is looking at the characteristics of development of the bargaining council
system in order to show that the bargaining councils system is not that different from the apartheid
industrial council system. In the context of this paper the implications of this are that the councils
will continue to operate in the same manner as before.
5The third chapter looks at the issues of coverage, extensions and exemptions. These three issues
define the institutional structure of bargaining councils. Coverage relates to the extent of the impact
of the bargaining councils. Although coverage does not appear to be extensive in relation to the
uncovered sectors it is important in terms of the new Labour Relations Act. The new LRA has
strengthened the powers of the bargaining council system and thus the rigiditie, n.troduced by the
system will become more extensive. The extensions are the mechanism by which the bargaining
councils extend the agreements negotiated by unions and employer representatives to non-parties. It
is these extensions that form the focal point of the criticism of the bargaining council system
because they introduce the rigidities into the labour market. Exemptions are the relief given to
parties adversely affected by the extensions. These ure important as they form the main counter
argument by proponents of the bargaining council system when confronted by criticism. They
believe that the exemptions counteract the possible negative effects of the extensions. However, it
appears that relative to the coverage of the councils exemptions are few. This chapter also
introduces criticisms of the system, that the processes within bargaining councils are not fair and
unbiased, that through the regulation regarding pensions, employment conditions and terms of
employment they increase the costs of the finn. The main point is that the bargaining councils effect
on the cost structures of firms is not only limited to minimum wages. This happens through
regulation of the firm's internal environment such as prescriptions of what constitutes a permanent
employee, and hiring and firing procedures, payments to pension scheme run by the council.
The fourth chapter presents the results from a survey of the Motor Industry and the Iron, Steel,
Engineering and Metallurgical Industry. I undertook this survey for the World Bank in conjunction
with Peter Moll. The purpose of the survey was to discover the extent and implications of
bargaining council regulations. The number of firms in the survey is relatively small and thus the
results are not definitive. However, they do suggest that the effect of the bargaining councils on cost
structures is important ann these effects are resulting in the firms employing a lower compliment of
labour. The survey provides support for the argument that because of the difficulty of altering the
number of workers that firm's employ they hire less labour than they otherwise would. This is in
order to avoid the risk that conditions in the product market deteriorate and they get burdened with
having to pay an oversized labour force. It is the constraint of not being able to readily adjust the
labour component that constitutes the rigidity present in the bargaining council system.
The final chapter presents conclusions drawn from the previous chapter. The main conclusion is that
bargaining councils do introduce rig.dities into the South African labour market. This happens
through the effect of regulations regarding the employment of workers on the decision-making
capacity of the firm.
6CHAPTER 1
LABOUR MARKET THEORY: THE CASE OF BARGAINING COUNCILS
Introduction
The theories of the effects of bargaining councils are intricately linked to theories of labour markets.
There are two mainstream views of the South African labour market. The first is grounded in the
neo-classical paradigm and the second finds its foundation in the structuralist view of the world.
These two approaches are seen as opposing one another. Both approaches have their strengths and
weaknesses; however, both are useful in explaining different aspects of the South African labour
market.
My intention in examining these approaches is to form a base from which to analyze the impact of
bargaining councils on the South African labour market. It is fundamental to understand the context
in which a phenomenon operates before one assesses the impact of that particular phenomenon. The
phenomenon in question is the bargaining council extensions and the context is the South African
labour market.
Theoretical Explanations of the Labour Market and Effects of Bargaining Councils
Neo-classical labour market theory is based on the idea that properly functioning labour markets
will equate the demand for labour with the supply of labour. Under these conditions the market will
clear and there will be no unemployment. This equilibrium is defined by a market clearing wage
rate. This wage rate equates the demand with the supply. These conditions will prevail if the labour
market is flexible on two counts, firstly the wage must be allowed to adjust to the equilibri lll1 rate
and secondly, demand must be free to equate to supply. This flexibility is also referred to as the
efficiency with which the labour market operates. The primary condition is that there is no
impediment (rigidity) to the functioning of the market. A rigidity would be any mechanism that
prohibited th- attainment of the market clearing wage rate. (For example, minimum wage
regulations that raised the actual wage rate above the market clearing wage rate.) This would result
in an increase in the labour supply and a decrease in the demand for labour. The net result would be
7unemployment. Rigidities enter the labour market through labour market institutions such as unions,
wage setting boards and any other mechanism that artificially affects the wage rate, the allocation of
labour and the income distribution. This results in a movement away [rom equilibrium.
The primary focus of this paper is an examination of the effect of bargaining councils on the
functioning of the labour market. Given that the bargaining council system is designed to bring
labour (unions) and employers together in order to negotiate employment conditions, a good
starting point is to examine the effects of unio.is on the labour market. Unions seek to protect their
workers and further their interests. Their main aim is to provide security for their members, such as
job and income security. In order to achieve this unions try to increase the income of their members
by negotiating higher wages and endeavour to create conditions where the laying off of workers is
as cumbersome and difficult for employers as possible. The effect of the unions is twofold, first the
increasing of the actual wage rate above the market clearing wage rate and secondly by making it
administratively more difficult for firms to operate and increasing administration costs. The effect
of this is the reduction ofthe firm's demand for labour and thus unemployment.
The negotiation of agreements (within the bargaining council forum) is not limited to those parties
present. Through the extension of agreements the conditions decided on by the parties become
binding on the rest of the industry. Two models in the neo-classical tradition are put forward by
Mol! (1995) and, Moll and Boccara (1996) to explain the effects of the extensions. The first is
contained in Wage Developments in South Africa in the 1990 IS (August 1995) and the second in
Labour Market Flexibility and Industrial Councils in South Africa (December 1996).
The first model is one of unions, industrial councils and "ergo oinnes" rules. Moll (1995) argues
that, in a free market economy, wage levels, firm size and capital intensity are correlated and this is
due to differential access to capital combined with the higher skill requirements of heavy
machinery. There may be other elements present such as high managerial skill that tends to
surround itself with high technical and worker skill., Furthermore, unions compel employers to pay
higher wages, but the effects are not uniform. Unionization is easier and cheaper in larger than
smaller firms because workers may more easily gather together and there are economies of scale in
addressing them and collecting dues. In the case of capital-intensive firms, workers have acquired
more on the job training than in labour-intensive firms and cannot easily be replaced by scab labour
in the event of a strike. Thus the workers have greater power so the union is able to negotiate for
higher wage and recruit more members. In the case of firms with highly skilled (and highly paid)
management's, the negotiation time of senior management is at a premium. They would probably
SI end more time attending to wildcat strikes, industrial sabotage and grievances if they did not
8permit orderly union negotiations. This is what Moll (1995) calls the "voice" aspect of unions,
which tends to increase the efficiency of unionized over non-unionized firms.
The model hypothesizes that there are two rounds of effects. The first round effect of unionization is
that in firms characterized by large size, capital intensity and highly skilled management, union
membership is likely to be larger and the effect of the unions on the wage rate is larger too. The
second round effect of unions occurs when management is faced with longer queues of workers
wishing to take die now better paid jobs. Management selects the more motivated and capable
workers whose productivity on the job is such that it partially compensates for their higher wages.
Management also introduces more capital-intensive production methods to save on the now higher
labour costs. Total employment in the union sector falls and the excess workers are initially
unemployed but me eventually absorbed into the non-unionized part of the industry where wages
fall and in the long run technology becomes more labour intensive. The implications on the labour
market of the extensions, within the context of the above model, can be broken down into three
types: effects on labour, effects on employer" and investment and effects on residual or uncovered
sectors (Moll 1995). They are as follows:
a) Effects on labour.
1. Wages of workers in smaller firms will rise, thus making them better off.
2. The wages of those still employed in the relevant industry are more equal.
3. Some of the smaller firms are incapable of paying the minimum wages and go out of business
and thus jobs are lost. Other firms in the same range reduce their labour force and, in the long
run, adopt more capital-intensive means of production. Thus since the cost of employment and
investment has risen, total investment and employment in the industry fall.
4. A second round effect of compulsory centralization is that wage levels in subsequent industrial
council negotiations rise.
5. The unions now have stronger grounds for informing workers in non-unionized firms about their
rights. They can force non-compliant firms to pay the legal minimum wage and provide the
appropriate working conditions by reporting them to the industrial council secretariat. The
union's recruiting efforts are thereby facilitated because they can easily demonstrate to workers
in non-compliant firms that they {unions) are able to deliver.
6. The model also predicts that if the legislation for extensions to non-parties is made available, the
unions and large firms that favour extensions will attempt to see that it is applied to all.
9b) Effects on employers and investment.
1. Firms unable to pay the minima will either go out of business or employ fewer workers. ';'he
cost of investment rises and the total investment in the industry declines.
2. The minimum wage creates a barrier to entry for small .firms. Many of these potential entrants,
in the post-apartheid South Africa, are likely to be black owned. In the long run there are fewer
black firm owners throughout the size range of firms, because fewer black firms have started up
and had the opportunity to grow to a large size. The effect on overall economic growth is
negative.
3. Profit rates rise throughout the industry This is because one element of competition, namely
over wages and working conditions, has been eliminated: smaller non-unionized firms are n
longer able to undercut larger ones. Tile profit may be seen as a rent; it is unearned benefit
conferred by legislation, not obtained through improvements in efficiency. The increased profit
rate is attenuated in the long term because it gives all incumbent employers an incentive to
invest more within the industry. It is attenuated further as the unions are enabled to negotiate to
capture a portion ofthe rent.
4. Since one element of competition is eliminated, larger firms are no longer forced to operate as
efficiently as before. Some large firms that would be incapable of withstanding competition
from small firms are kept in business. This negative effect on dynamic efficiency reduces the
growth rate of the economy.
c) Effects on the residual or uncovered sectors.
1. Wages in the rest of the economy fall as the workers dis-employed by the "ergo omnes" rule
look for jobs in other industries. If, as in South Africa, most of the non-primary sectors are
covered by industrial council minima and/or employer/union agreements, these workers fall on
residual sectors such as self-employment, domestic service, gardening, or casual work for small
construction concerns.
2. If the wage differential is large it induces search or waiting behaviour by workers. Instead of
working in the uncovered sector, it is in the interest of some workers to search, to queue or
simply to wait for a covered sector job. The measured number of the unemployed rises.
3. One element of inequality increases namely that between the covered sectors and the residual
sectors in terms of wages.
The second model proposed by Moll and Boccara (1996)1 argues that in the unionized part of the
economy workers are able to enjoy above competitive wage levels. This is achieved as long as they
are willing to spend part of their benefit on lobbying government for an extension of the union wage
IMoll and Boccara (1996), piO
10
to the non-union sector, and on policing these wage regulations. The regulations in the covered
sector depress the wage in the uncovered sector. At the same time, workers have a reservation wage
which is undergirded by the prospect of intra-familial distributions arising from, among other
things, the social pensions paid to all workers above the age of 60 (women) or 65 (men). Workers
whose reservation wage exceeds their actual wage offers decide to "wait" in unemployment until
better offers arrive. The more the industrial council regulations depress the wage in the uncovered
sector, and the higher the expected benefit, the more unemployment is generated. This model
examines the resultant effects on welfare. The advantage of extensions is higher wages for workers
in the covered sector. There are three disadvantages: diminished output in the covered sector; the
industrial council's cost of policing; and the long-term loss of skills and experience. The only
unpredictable factor is that output in the uncovered sector may increase or decrease depending on
the magnitudes of investment captured from the covered sector. The implication of this model is
that the bargaining councils through their affect on the wage rate increase unemployment and its
duration.
H. , .ng looked at these models, I DOW turn to the evidence substantiating these views of the effects
of Bargaining Council's on the South African labour market. The model predicts that there will be a
substantial wage gap between covered and uncovered sectors. There are large differentials of
between 77 percent and 131 percent' between the covered and uncovered sectors that create
incentives for workers to remain unemployed while waiting, searching or queuing for covered
sector jobs. Moreover, since the covered sector accounts for a substantial portion of the urban
economy, it is likely that the differentials have induced a considerable movement of labour out of
the covered into uncovered sectors. Thus the low uncovered sector wage is partly the result of the
many covered-sector employers reducing their labour forces. Moll (1995)3 argues that unions have
been successful from the point of view that they have preserved the covered uncovered wage
differentials in spite oflow or stagnant economic grcwth and population influx.
The model predicts that participation is more common in larger firms than in small ones. A sample
by du Toit et aI (1995)4 indicates that the average firm had 53 employees, and the average non-party
firm had 13 employees. Several commentators have noted that some of the lat\';;' firms use the
industrial councils to negotiate a lower wage than they would otherwise h<''i~ to pay, and this
provides an incentive from the large firm end of the industry for remaining in the industrial council
Moll (1995). Furthermore, larger firms also seek the elimination of "unfair" wage competition from
2 Moll and Boccara (1996). p21
J Moll (1995), p3-'
4 Moll and Boccara (1996). quoting du Toit et al. 1995
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small firms, as Moll (1995) and Bendix (1995)5 argue, if the "ergo omnes" rules were done away
with the industrial councils would fall away because they would no longer be useful to big business.
Moll (1995) found that there was strong support of the compulsory aspect of centralization by the
unions, however, small business was opposed to industrial council activity. A sample by du Toit et
al. (1995)6 found that 22 out of 25 (small) firms held that agreements negatively affected their
open tions. Furthermore 40 percent of the sample stated that the minimum wages set by the councils
were a problem for their business, and 12 percent said that labour inflexibility was a problem.
To test the second model Moll and Boccara (1996) examined three questions. Firstly are the
industrial council minima binding? Secondly do the industrial council rulings to non-parties reduce
employment in the covered sector, i.e. do council ruling raise labour costs? Thirdly does the
expectation of a transfer benefit tend to discourage low-wage employment from the demand E ide,
i.e. do transfers increase the length of unemployment spells, or do they decrease the probability of
labour market participation. Moll and Boccara (1996) provide evidence that the minima are binding,
saying that a substantial proportion of firms pay wages at or only slightly above the minima, so that
changes in the minima have real effects on labour costs. Enforcement of industrial council rulings is
near universal for firms in the main business districts. However, in the townships where micro-
enterprises are common, there is frequently little enforcement, although there is an increasing trend
towards effective inspection. He also finds some tentative evidence that intra-familial redistribution
of transfers, such as pensions, tend to increase unemployment.
These two models find their basis in neo-classical theory. They provide a useful insight into the
effects of the extensions. The first model distinguishes between the cost structures of small and
large firms. Sm"n labour intensive firms have lower costs than larger more capital-intensive firms
do. This distinct. is important when looking at the impact of the extensions in equalizing cost
levels across an industry. This equalization has the effect of raising the labour costs as well as
administration costs of smaller films. Meanwhile the larger firms can internalize the administration
costs and lower their labour costs (Standing et al. 1996)7. This prejudices the operation of the
smaller firms. In terms of the behaviour of the parties to the process the model is consistent in its
contention that the parties to the agreements are rent seeking. This behaviour is rational in the
context of agents attempting to control the environment within which they operate. For example, a
firm would create barriers to entry or make it difficult for other firms to compete if it had the means
to do so. The means in this case is the bargaining council system. These models suggest that
bargaining council agreements should not be extended to non-parties. Rather the bargaining
5 Moll (1995) quotes Bendix (1995), p492
6 Moll (19\15) quotes du Toit et at. (1995), p59
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councils should be made voluntary organizations that facilitate bargaining between firms and unions
but do not impose conditions on non-parties.
The structuralist view is in opposition to the above models. This view is contained in the Labour
Market Commission Report and the ILO Report. In this view high levels of inflexibility and low
levels of security characterize the South African labour market. The structuralists believe that the
free market philosophy is flawed in that it does not achieve efficient outcome in the labour market.
The idea is that institutional rigidities will never be removed from the labour market and thus
intervention is needed to ensure efficient outcomes. An efficient labour market according to them is
one in which the needs o" flexibility and security are reconciled and a balance is achieved between
them. This balance is to be achieved through the bargaining council system where security and
flexibility can be bargained for between labour and business.
The structuralists see labour and business as adversaries. Each is attempting to achieve a different
goal as regards the other. Labour is looking to increase levels of security while business is seeking
increased flexibility. These different objectives are seen as opposing. Flexibility for workers means
less security in terms of job and income security. Workers see flexibility as the empl "er's ability to
change working conditions. This introduces a level of uncertainty for workers, as rney do not know
what the future holds for them as the business environment changes. Firms on the other hand see
security as an impediment to their ability to react to changes in the business environment. Firms
would like to be able to adapt to these changes as fast as possible. However, if firms cannot alter
their labour inputs or costs quickly enough then this may have negative implications for their
existence. It is fundamentally this opposition between employer and employee needs that forms the
basis for the structuralist viewpoint. The objective of reconciling these needs is in the opinion ofthe
ILO and Labour Market Commission Reports best achieved through 'voice regulation'. The ILO
position is summed up as follower'
"The competing or conflicting set of concerns for employers and workers both need to be
taken into account, as do those of the more marginalised or vulnerable on each side of the
spectrum. They cannot be given their due weight if one party or the other is enfeebled or
fragmented. This is ultimately why 'voice' mechanisms, or representative institutions, are
required even though the neo-liberal supply side advocates of flexibility and 'deregulation'
regard institutions and regulations as rigidities and the main SOL/rceof inflexibility. Those
sirens of deregulation are wrong, because unless flexibility is bargained between strong
7 Standing et aJ. (1996), pISS
8 Labour Market Commission Report, pI2
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negotiators, opportunism w( tid lead to short term gains by one side or the other (usually
the large scale powerful employers) that would have long term adverse consequences for
d...»amic efficiency. "
The structuralists believ- that the only way to achieve an efficient outcome in the labour market is
the reconciliation of these two opposing objectives. They believe that the free market system with
no labour market intervention will not achieve this. The intervention that they are calling for falls
under the blanket of labour market regulation. The objective of this labour market regulation is a
system of regulated flexibility. This system consists of the bargaining council system underpinned
by labour market regulation. The bargaining council system is the means by which 'voice
regulation' functions, i.e. this is where the employers and employees negotiate the balance between
flexibility and security. However, in order to force parties to the bargaining table, the 1: argaining
council system must have legal recourse. This legal recourse is the extension of agreements, The
idea is that government set down broad regula.ions regarding employment conditions and the
specific conditions and wage levels be decided in the bargaining council forum. The agreements
reached ate then extended to the entire industry so that conditions are equalized for all.
The structuralists see the labour market as being highly unequal. This can be observed in the high
wage differentials that are reflected in the highly skewed income distribution as well as the skill
acquisition of different population groups. (White professionals and managerial personnel
accompanied by an over abundance of black unskilled labour). The structuralists conclude that there
is an important link between wages and employment. The estimated long run wage elasticity of
labour demand is _0.79 and this is worrying in the context of high unemployment. The reason is that
wage increases impact negatively on employment to the extent that, over the long term, a 10%
increase in wages is going to result in a seven-percent drop in relative employment (although this
may not be In absolute terms). This suggests that in the long run, employment levels are sensitive to
changes in wage levels. The structuralists, however, argue that the key issue for competitiveness of
industries is not the wage but the unit labour cost. In saying this they i-nply that a range of measures
is needed to contain increases in unit labour costs. Unit labour costs are the labour costs per unit of
output and as such if productivity increases and wages remain the same then unit labour costs will
decrease. The Labour Market Commission is saying that measures are needed to address the levels
of productivity because there is evidence to suggest that average unit labour costs in South Africa
are higher than comparable middle income countries. Thus to bring down the unit labour costs they
believe that more effort should be put into increasing the productivity of workers. This is implicitly
an efficiency wage argument. From this standpoint they argue that there should not be a decline in
9 T.abour Market Commission Report, p52
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wage levels because the impact on average unit labour costs of depressing unskilled wages may be
relatively small depending on labour intensity and on the contribution of wages (especially
unskilled wages) to total labour costs. They believe that it would be more efficient to increase the
levels of productivity rather than decrease wages because of the positive correlation between the
two. Thus ifthere was a decrease in wages then productivity would also decrease. In their view this
is undesirable and will impact negatively on growth in the economy.
Increased international competition has placed a strong burden of adjustment on South African
firms and as a result labour costs may well be comparatively high relative to production especially
for those films using a high proportion of unskilled workers. Some analysts (essentially proponents
of the neo-classical paradigm) have blamed "high unskilled wages" for South Africa's lack of
competition and its high level of unemployment. The issue is seen as more complex than common
sense orthodoxy assumes, especially accounting for the level of unskilled wages and productivity .,f
unskilled workers, The belief is that the higher skill, higher wage industrial sectors are unlikely to
generate large numbers of new jobs and that future formal-sector employment growth is most likely
to occur in lower wage more labour intensive sectors such as tourism and clothing. Thus they see it
as simplistic to conclude that wages can simply be lowered, or that job growth would automatically
follow a reduction in wages. Wage repression in the view of the Labour Market Commission may
simply breed resistance and results in increased industrial and social unrest that would discourage
both growth and new employment. They argue that to some extent there is a wage-employment
trade-off, however, it does not follow that unemployment is simply caused by high wages. They
believe that other factors are also responsible such as macroeconomic and industrial policies. For
example, contractionary and uncoordinated macroeconomic policies that reward capital intensive
investments impact negatively on employment growth independently of the operation of any wage
employment trade-off. Also the Labour Market Commission cites anecdotal evidence to suggest that
many employers are reluctant to employ large numbers of unskilled workers because of the 'hassle
factor', i.e. the time and management energy involved in dealing with a demanding workforce
aware of its lights. They recognize that the shortages of skilled labour are a recognizable constraint
on economic growth. Labour intensive production also requires skilled employees (essentially
managers) and these shortages may act as a bottleneck as much as in the capital intensive sectors.'?
The structuralist support of the bargaining council system stems from the belief that by reconciling
the needs of security (workers) and flexibility (employers) a system will be created where
productivity will be increased. The argument is that if workers are content then they will be more
productive and by addressing their need for security in the workplace this will be accomplished.
10 Labour Market Commission Report, p52
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The argument is that firms should focus on the long-term instead of the short-term. The
structuralists argue that to reduce costs and become more competitive, firms will in the short-term
seek to lower the wage rate, however, in the long term it is not feasible to continually lower the
wage rate. The structuralists argue that it is in the firm's interests to increase productivity and thus
their competitiveness. This can only be achieved in the long-term. The structuralists believe that the
bargaining council system will force firms to become active in finding ways to increase labour
productivity and thus act in the firms and workers long-term interests. The structuralists argue that
this will lead to stability in the wage rate and the workforce will be content. Thus all round stability
will be achieved in the labour market.
The structuralist approach is insightful into the motivations of employees and employers. It
recognizes that employers and employees have opposing motives. This opposition in the respective
motives is seen as the major impediment to the efficient functioning of the labour market. This is
entirely plausible given peoples self interest. However, this approach does not go far enough in
explaining the behaviour of firms, unions and employees. The crucial aspect that they do not seem
to address is the self-interest of union officials. Although the union officials have to work within the
constraint of satisfying their members there is still latitude enough for them to pursue their own
interests. Thus we have perhaps three players in the labour market, firms, employees and union
officials. Furthermore the aspect of a firms motive that is not accounted for is their will to affect the
environment in which they operate. If a firm can create an environment that will minimize
competition from other firms such as higher costs for other firms or barriers to entry, then it will.
The structuralist account does not address the union's use of the system to create a closed shop
situation where its workers are ~rotected from the threat of non-union workers and in so doing
increase unemployment. The implications of the above is that they could negate the positive effects
of negotiation and lead to greater impediments in the labour mal.f et.
It is true that the labour market is more comphcated than the simple neo-classical model would
suggest, however, the effect of the price mechanism in the allocation of labour and levels of
employment cannot be neglected. The wage rate sends signals to the agents in the economy and if
distorted will lead to inefficient behaviour resulting in unemployment. On the issue of the wage rate
the Labour Market commission implicitly hinted at the existence efficiency \\ ages and the link
hetween wage levels and productivity when they discussed the issue of unit labour costs. The
efficiency wage models argue that if the level of wages affects the productivity, then it may be in
the firm's interest to raise the wage rate above the market clearing level and to refuse to cut wages,
despite the resulting unemployment." For example, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) show that firms
11 Azam, p79
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have an incentive to increase the wage above the market clearing wage, as a "worker discipline
device", The argument is as follows: if there is full employment with the same wage paid to all
workers, the incentive for shirking is strong, When caught shirking, the worker is fired at no cost to
him since he is bound to immediately find a new job, Thus to improve the productivity of workers,
firms must try and offer better wages than do the competitors in order for the workers to face some
prospect of loss when they get caught shirking. But by then all the firms pay a wage higher than the
market clearing wage and the resulting unemployment is sufficient penalty to deter, at equilibrium.
In the case of the labour turnover model (Stiglitz 1974), firms have the incentive to increase the
wage above the market clearing rate in order to reduce the turnover costs. In other words firms pay
higher wages, with a positive unemployment rate, so as to make the expected outside wage low thus
reducing the turnover rate of employees. An extra dimension is that the turnover rate not only
depends on the wage paid within industry but also those in other sectors such as the relative rural
wage, 12
The implication of the efficiency wage argument as presented by the Labour Market Commission is
that an adjustment of the wage rate downwards, as prescribed by the neo-classical model, will
reduce the level of productivity. The reduction of'prodectivity will in tum impact negatively on the
level of output and hence GDP. This is in their opinion 'ndesirable if the obj ective of labour market
reform is to foster growth and development.
The explanations of the ILO Report and the Labour Market Commission neglected one aspect of
structuralist theory, namely the insider outsider approach. The insider-outsider approach in contrast
with the neo-classical approach recognizes that incumbent workers (insiders) can influence the
hiring and firing decisions of the firm. There are two oasic elements that drive a wedge between the
wage paid to insiders and the reservation wage of the outsiders: firstly, there are various costs for
hiring and tor firing; second, insiders possess a know-how that outsiders need to acquire and this
entails a productivity differential. Azam (1994) notes that this theory can offer an explanation of
unemployment, and it has important consequences for macroeconomic dynamics and the effect of
nominal shocks on output and unemployment, It implies a ratchet effect or hysteresis effect.'3 For
example, if some insiders are fired after an unexpected negative shock and rapidly lose their status
(becoming outsiders), then the ecc tomy settles ~t this new equilibrium level with a lower level of
employment than in the preshock equilibrium, even after the shock has disappeared,
12 Azam, p84
13 Azam, p91
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The efficiency wage and insider-outsider models are useful in explaining unemployment without
the existence of i-iterventions by the authorities that introduce rigidities (such as minimum wages).
This suggests thr.t even if markets are left alone they will no: necessarily reach equilibrium.
However, the question is ir what way are these rigidities introduced into the labour market and the
magnitude of this effect. For example the efficiency wage effect may be limited to larger more
capital intensive firms that have higher skill requirements than do smaller more labour intense
firms. The insider outsider theory in this paper relates to workers covered by extensions and those
that work in uncovered sectors. It implies that covered workers will attempt to create barriers
against incoming workers that may try to undercut them in terms of wages.
Conclusions
The theories of the South African labour market with reference to bargaining councils all offer
useful insight into the dynamics of this market. I believe that you cannot look at one theory
exclusively. The main contribution of the neo-classical theory is that it explains the effect of the
bargaining councils on employment through the effect of extensions raising the cost structure of
smaller firms. This happens because the extensions force smaller firms to pay higher wages than
they otherwise would and therefore cannot employ more workers than they presently do or did so in
the past. Larger firms on the other hand end up paying 10»e: wages than they would have too
without the negotiated agreements. Furthermore, the theory states that the larger firms that attend
the negotiation of the agreement actively seek these conditions. Smaller firms that cannot devote the
resources to the negotiation and do not participate in them are discriminated against. These actions
of the larger firms are seen as the erection of barriers to entry,
The structuralist approach sheds light on the interaction between workers and employers. It
highlights the differences between employer motivation and employee motivation. These
motivations affect the behaviour of the respective parties. The workers are seeking greater security
and the firms are seeking greater flexibility in the labour market. These goals are seen as opposing
and result in conflict between workers and firms. The solution suggested by the structuralist
orthodoxy is the bringing together of business and labour under the auspices of bargaining councils
to negotiate the balance between their respective needs.
A further aspect of the structuralist theory is their opposition to any decrease in wages. In their view
a decline in the wage rate will lead to a decline in the level of productivity of workers and result in a
decrease in output. The structuralist approach argues that wages should not be decreased, rather the
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level of productivity should be in-reased. This implicitly implies the existence of efficiency wages.
Their solution is the imposidon of measure that will raise productivity levels.
The fundamental difference between the structuralist and neo-classical view is that the neo-classical
model is focused on the demand side and calls for an adjustment in the wage levels while the
structuralists focus on the supply side: and argue that it is more important to increase productivity
levels. The solution according to the neo-classical model is the deregulation of the labour market.
This would entail the downgrading or rem ova , of bargaining councils. On tl- <her hand the
structuralist approach argues that the bargaining council system is the panacea resolving the
problems in the South African labour market. The question of whether the correct solution is
increasing or decreasing regulation of the labour market is somewhat complex and beyond the
scope of this paper. The scope of this paper is to examine the effects of bargaining councils. The
remainder of this paper will be devoted to investigating the degree and effect of these rigidities as
wen as the types of rigidities that are introduced. The next chapter deals with the development of
the b,,~gaining council system. This is crucial to the understanding of the effect of bargaining
councils because in effect they are an apartheid structure that is still operating in the new
democratic South Africa.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BARGAINING COUNCIL SYSTEM
Introduction
In order to examine the nature and extent of the effects of bargaining councils one must first
understand how they came into existence. The purpose of this chapter is to look at the history of the
bargaining council system. It was said in the previous chapter that the bargaining councils are in
effect the old industrial councils merely renamed. Therefore the nature of the development and
objectives of the old industrial council system are important in explaining the functioning of
bargaining councils.
It is generally accepted that the industrial council system was formed to promote selectivity and
protect the jobs of the white minority. It can be argued that with the changes in the South African
labour market the industrial council system evolved from one that discriminated on the grounds of
race to one that protects and advances the interests of a specific group of individuals, namely the
employed unionized workers and big business.
This chapter looks at this process and examines the reasons for the changes that result in the
creation of the current bargaining council system.
The Development of the Bargaining Council System
The evolution of the South African labour market was characterized by initial high flexibility
moving over time towards greater rigidity (Standing et. al. 1996). The early legislative and
regularity framework was intended to 'free' the labour supply to the mines and commercial films.
In 1924 the Industrial Conciliation Act was passed and sought to protect the unionized white
workers (poor whites) from cheap black labour. This was the firrt substantial move towards
regulated labour markets in South Africa. After the election of the national government in 1948 the
government attempted to create a system of regulated rigidity through policies such as, pass laws,
influx controls, job reservation and regional development policies. These were intended to direct
labour mobility and lower the labour cost of black workers while protecting the wages of the whites
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(Standing et al 1996). The 1956 Labour Relations Act (LRA) superseded the 1924 Conciliation Act.
This Act formed the cornerstone of the apartheid labour market. The LRA sti=mlated the
establishment of "industrial councils" whose role it was to regulate the labour market ~ . I'! sectoral
level for the benefit of the white minority. Under the LRA registered employer organizations and
registered trade unions could voluntarily agree to establish an industrial COID1Cil, the membership of
parties was, however, at the discretion of the registrar (section 18). This discretion meant that the
registrar could decide on which class of worker was eligible for representation. Black workers were
not eligible. The industrial council system was seen as a means of implementing selective rigidity. 14
The ILO Report summarizes the flavour of the system in saying that: 15
"The industrial council system encouraged a selective (racially based) form of regulated
corporatism through notions such as "sufficiently representative" - which of course
excluded black workers who were not allowed to form recognized trade unions until after
1979 - and reference to "stability", which has been an objective of all hegemonic systems
including the welfare state regimes of post-1945 western Europe. The industrial council
system was illtended to provide labour security for protected white insiders, Who thereby
could set the conditions theyfavoured and impose post entry closed shops. The system went
so far as to allow the Minister to make "extensions" of Industrial Council agreements to
non-parties, i.e. impose so called 'ergo omnes rules on the sector or area covered by the
agreement. "
The extensions to non-parties arose out of the concern to protect white labourers from competition
from black labourers. The Industrial Councils were empowered to set minimum wages for workers
as well as conditions of employment, Once an agreement was reached, employers were bound to
provide at least the minimum wage agreed to and the unions were bound not to strike. Strikes could
only take place after proper negotiations had taken place. All employers and unions in industries
with industrial councils were required to register under the Act, even if they did not participate in
the negotiations. .
The basis of the government strategy was the regulation of minimum conditions of employment and
minimum wages through the use of individual employment contract under common law, statutory
law and collective agreement. The complexity of the system created problems resulting from
overlapping jurisdictions and this is evident in the multitude of wage determinations, industrial
councils, labour orders, apprenticeship regulations, conciliation board agreements and arbitration
14 Standing et at. (1996), p14
15 Standing et at. (1996), p14
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awards. The LRA amendment of 1981 introduced the concept of a 'labour order', which was more
selective in regulatory coverage, to cover areas not covered by the Wage board.
The Wage Act through Wage Boards set minimum wages for all areas except bantustans. Selectivity
was promoted by the fact that the Wage Board was dominated by Ministerial discretion as it was tbe
Minister who appointed the board, set its terms of reference and decided to accept or ignore its
recommendations in making a wage determination. Exemptions had to be sought directly from the
Minister. The Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) set maxima for hours work and
overtime, restrictions on continuous work and provisions relating to duration of meal times, Sunday
work, annual leave, sick leave and maternity leave. Under apartheid these regulations were
selective, for example the exclusion of agricultural-workers, domestic workers and public service
workers, with a myriad of other exclusions and exemptions. Minimum standards did not apply in
.ht. same way to all workers that were covered by the act; fur example casual workers were treated
differently to so-called 'indefinite' employment contracts. The BCEA gave very little employment
security: it stipulated two weeks notice of termination of employment for monthly paid workers,
one week for weekly paid workers and none for casual workers (section 14). Employers could only
obtain exemptions to the various regulations through application to the Minister of Labour and only
the Minister was empowered to grant them regarding any provision of the BCEA.16
Between the LRA, Wage Act and the BCEA the government created a system of regulation and
control in the labour market. The apartheid labour market enabled the white minority to increase its
wealth at the expense of the black majority. However, conflicts between the needs for
industrialization and the character of selective regulations began to put pressure on the apartheid
labour market. This led to the recognizing of black trade unions. The culmination was the Industrial
Conciliation Act of 1979 where Africans Were permitted to join registered trade unions or form
trade unions that would be eligible for registration. This ultimately led to the loss of control of the
Industrial Councils by the white unions. The result of this was that the wedge between white and
African workers was recycled as a wedge between "insiders" or workers employed in the industries
covered by the industrial councils, and "outsiders" or workers who were either unemployed or were
employed in industries not covered by the industrial councils.!"
Standing et al. (1996) argue that the regulatory framework of the apartheid labour market became
ineffectual as the conflict between the needs of industrialization and the character of selective
regulations sharpened in the 1980's and 1990's. It was the growth and diversification of
10 Standing et al. (1996), p13 notes that the protection was for the white minority, to protect them from outsiders.
11Moll and Boccara (1996). p5
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manufacturing, and to a certain extent construction and services, that accelerated the erosion of the
old system, Manufacturing needed more skilled workers and needed to incorporate the rapidly
growing black urban industrial population. Economic development and industrialization produced
untenable tensions in the dominant social relations of production. Pressures on the system of
"selective rigidity" came from the concentration of capital and the growing desire to promote
industrial development, coupled with growing international hostility to apartheid and the resistance
of black urban youths." By the 1990's there were many institutional features inherited from the
apartheid era that were gradually being stripped of their former functions and context.
The movement towards a democratic South Africa that culminated in the first democratic elections
in 1994 has led to a revision of labour market legislation, the goal being the creation of a system of
regulated flexibility as defined by the Labour Market Commission." This is encompassed in the
Labour Relations Act, No 66 of September 1995. The Act makes provision for the strengthening of
collective bargaining through the preservation of the industrial council system under the new name
"Bargaining Councils". The Act provides for the automatic extension of Bargaining Council
agreements to non-parties if the majority of the Council requests it and the both unions and
employers represent 50 percent or more of the workforce. It strengthens union rights by prohibiting
the dismissal of legal strikers, legalizing sympathy strikes, and enabling legal picketing." The
Labour Relations Act recognves that where bargaining strengths are very unequal, the Wage Board
will have to protect workers. In promoting institutional mechanisms for collective bargaining, the
LRA proposes that at the national level there will be a tripartite Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration, which will replace the former conciliation service. There will also be a
national Labour Court, whose judges will be appointed by the President in consultation with
NEDLAC. The changes to t1, •law are fivefold, namely: 21
1. Bargaining Councils cover both private and public sector parties;
2. Small-scale employers must have their interests represented;
3. Bargaining Council representativeness of an industry mu.t be v, .ewed annually;
4. The Minister of Labour retains the power to extend agreeme .s tr non parties;
5. Dispute resolution capacity should be improved through .".~d,ation and arbitration procedures;
Reformers were intent on preserving what they perceived as the protective features that tend to give
forms of labour security while promoting economic development, dynamic efficiency and
18 Standing et al. (1996), pIS
19 Standing et al. (1996), p1S
20 Moll and Boccara (1996), p6
21 Standing et al. (1996), p 169
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restructuring. They have moved to reform industrial relations through the 1995 Labour Relations
Act, which is an attempt at strengthening sectoral collective bargaining and sectoral forms of
tripartism. The general direction of these initiatives could actually be described as creating a system
of "regulated flexibility" (Standing et. a1.). The Labour Market Commission believes that
bargaining council agreements between unions and employers can generally lead to realistic and
agreed minimum conditions being determined since they include the parties directly affected. In
their opinion collective bargaining is the preferred system. The Con mission also believes that there
is some justification for the judicious use of legal incentives, using mechanisms of the Wage Act
and the LRA's provisions allowing the extension of bargaining council agreements.
Notwithstanding the reforms, the bargaining councils are still run by the same bureaucrats that
where in charge of the functioning of industrial councils. The union and the employer
representatives are the same and have the same motivations and objectives as before. The
bargaining councils are in effect the same institutions that operated in the apartheid system. The
changes to the labour relations act have served to strengthen the bargaining council system in terms
of coverage and ability to extend agreements. In my opinion the bargaining councils have not
changed into the institutions that were envisaged in the new Labour Relations Act.
Conclusions
Given the changes to the indu 'al council system that transformed it into the bargaining council
system, it is fair to say that the two systems are essentially the same if not in specifics then in
character. The implications for the ideals of the Labour Market Commission Report are that the
equality they believed would be delivered through negotiation within this forum will not be
realized. The implications of the models in chapter one especially the more neo-classical models by
Moll point towards increased unemployment. This, needless to say, has severe consequences for the
economy.
In theory I do not see any problem with using the bargaining council system as a mechanism in the
labour market, however, the problem is the manipulation of the system in order to serve a select
group's interests. In addressing the problems in the South African labour market one should keep in
mind that high levels or inflexibility are present.
Thus far I have examined the theoretical and historical perspectives of the bargaining council
system. Some bodies such as the bargaining councils themselves and the proponents of the
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bargaining council system would argue that relief is given to firms as regards the extensions and
this negates any negative effects resulting from the extensions. Proponents would also argue that the
coverage of bargaining councils is not extensive and thus the impact of them is relatively small
when looking at the entire labour market. In the next chapter I address the issues surrounding the
scope and activities of bargaining councils.
25
CHAf"IER3
THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE SOUT.H AFRICAN LABOUR MARKET
WITH REFERENCE TO BARGAINING COUNCILS
Introduction
This chapter examines the scope and workings of the bargaining councils in the labour market.
'Voice mechanisms' as envisaged by the ILO Report and the Labour Market Commission Report
are promoted by the new LRA in the form of'Bargaining ~, "'~ils. The Act strengthened collective
bargaining, which is seen as essential in order to achieve the goal of "regulated flexibility" (as
envisaged in the ILO and Labour Market Commission Reports) and an equitable labour market. In
this forum employers and employees, represented by employer associations and unions repectively,
negotiate the balance between flexibility and security.
The practicality is that once a year the parties within an industry meet in order to negotiate
agreements regarding minimum wages, conditions of employment and any other related issues.
Once the negotiations are completed and the agreement finalized then if the council has been
granted the ability to extend the agreements the conditions of the agreements become binding on all
firms and workers in that industry. In those industries where extensions do not exist, the agreement
is only binding on the parties to the agreement.
The rest of this chapter is devoted to examining the main issues regarding the extension of
agreements. These are coverage, extensions and exemptions. I have restricted the scope to these
three issues because ' , are the main issues of debate surrounding the extent and magnitude of the
effects of bargaining councils and they are the main points around which the debate about the
desirability of bargaining councils revolves.
Bargaining Council Coverage
The reason to examine the coverage of bargaining councils is that it gives an indication of the
number of firms and employees that are directly influenced by the bargaining council system. Table
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1 shows the number of councils present in each year, the number of wage agreements, the number
of employers that were covered by those agreements and the number of affected employees. Moll
and Boccara (1996)22 argue that the coverage measures underestimate the impact of the regulation
in question. According to Table 1, the industriai council system's coverage waned from 1.2 million
workers in 1981 to 0.5 million in 1990, before expanding again to 0.8ll1il1ion by 1993 and 1 million
by 1994. Moll and Boccara (1996), Fallon and Lucas (1996) believe that the system's coverage rose
to 1.3 million by 1995, and that it may lise further to 1.6 million as the Labour Relations Act of
1996 is progressively implemented'", One reason for the decline in membership in the eighties as
suggested by Standing et al (1996), is that management was increasingly resorting to decentralized,
plant level bargaining, even within individual firms, Horwitz and Franklin (1~~6) corroborated this
sentiment in their study of developments in the South African labour markets.
Table 1. Coverage of industrial councils, 1981 -1995
ear Number Number of Employers Employees
of wage
cuuncils lagreements
1981 104 99 46,668 1,265,000
1982 104 77 48,:109 1,267,222
1983 104 87 4(.;,1)75 1,171,724
1984 102 94 51,031 1,183,399
1985 100 85 48,329 1,084,278
1986 99 177 47,032 961,302
1937 97 ..;6 45,941 964,881
1988 95 68 44,927 98t',00
1980 94 71 41,205 958,150
1990 92 60 31,292 515,082
1991 87 61 49,740 761,332
1992 87 84 51,266 583,472
1993 85 73 65,578 805,133
J1994 81 - 54,000 1,000,0001995 81 - -
(Source: Moll and Boccara (1996), p.8, from Standmg et al. (1996), p, 145, Table 5.1, in
tum from the Department of Labour.)
~: Moll and Boccara (1996), pll
~lMoll and Boccara (1996), p7 quoting Fallon and Lucas (1996) P18 and 24.
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Furthermore, management is also seen as seeking ways around the industrial council rulings by, for
instance, using labour contractors to perform tasks such as cleaning and security. Furthermore,
employment in some of the largest manufacturing industries declined (Moll 1996).24
The scope of coverage varies, for example as of May 1992, nine percent of the councils had a
national scope, 43 percent a regional scope (encompassing seven or more magisterial districts), 40
percent a local scope (six or fewer districts), and 8 percent had only a company scope."
Moll and Boccara (1996) argue that the industrial council arrangement is a barrier to entry; it raises
labour costs and reduces incentives for investment in the covered sectors. It reduces the number of
firms active in the covered industry. As a result the covered ratio - whether the proportion of
workers covered or the proportion of fi.ms covered - falls over time, as the industrial council's
regulations take hold. The industrial council arrangement in acting as a barrier to entry extends its
impact beyond the regional jurisdiction stated in the councils Main Agreements.'" An investor
wishing to take advantage of the lower wage in a region excluded from the ambit of a narticular
industrial council would have to take into account the likelihood that, once the firm is established an
industrial council could be set up in order to regulate this new activity. The intention of legislation
is opportunistic: the objective is to regulate the labour process wherever the unions perceive
substantial benefit from doing so. Therefore if a large manufacturing plant were established in a
small town outside the jurisdiction of the industrial council, and if the union were to bee.nne active,
before long a bargaining council would be in place and the labour costs would have risen. Coverage
is important as it indicates the possible impact of extensions of agreements, i.e, the number of firms
and workers affected by them. This is the issue to which I now tum.
Extensions
Extensions, otherwise known as "ergo omnes", occur when an agreement reached within the
industrial council forum becomes binding on the entire industry. Therefore, the terms and
prescription of the particular agreement bind even non-parties to the negotiation process.
Extensions are made at the Minister of Labour's discretion. The 1995 LRA prescribes that if
employers and employees represent more than 50 percent in an industry then the Minister of Labour
is bound to extend them. However, if this condition is not met then it is up to the Minister after
24 Moll and Boeeara (1996). p8
21 Moll and Boceara (1996). p8
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careful consideration. The extension of agreements has been widespread, as of April 1994, 69 out of
75 council agreements had been subject to extensions." In some cases, the parties to an agreement
have declined gradually as a share of the total. Moll and Boccara (1996)28 states that in 1981 the
largest industrial council (the National Bargaining Council for Iron, Steel, Engineering and
Metallurgical Industry) accounted for 42 percent of all firms covered by the agreement. In 1995 the
council represented only 28 percent, and the workers employed by party firms in 1981 accounted
for 82 percent of all covered workers, but by 1995 they were only 65 percent of the total. This
would seem to indicate that extensions have become more prevalent elsewhere in the economy, this
is indicated by the decrease in the share of coverage of the National Bargaining Council for Iron,
Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry which is the largest.
In 1985, some 64 percent of workers in the manufacturing sector were covered by industrial council
agreements (Moll 1993). In the sample of manufacturing firms selected for the Labour Market
Flexibility Survey by Standing et al. (1996), fifty percent were covered by industrial councils.
However, in the non-manufacturing sectors there exists what might be termed a "voluntary" system
of collective bargaining where negotiations occur at the level of the factory, the firm, a group of
firms, or the entire industry, without such compulsory aspects as registration with the industrial
council or forced compliance with industrial council rulings by non-parties. An example is the
cement industry in which there are a small number of large producers that bargain jointly with the
unions. The important issue as regards extensions is the contention that they increase wage
differentials between covered and uncovered sectors. Although there is debate as to the magnitude
of this effect, the fact that there is an effect is cause enough for concern especially in light of the
strengthening of the power .. of Bargaining Councils by the new LRA..
When confronted with criticisms of extensions, the proponents of this system argue that there are
exemptions from agreements and thus there are no negative effects. However, the granting of
exemptions is a contentious issue from the point of view that they are at the discretion of the
Bargaining Council and the process by which applications are processed is perceived as being
inefficient and biased.
26 Moll and Boccara (1996), p7 quoting Peter Doyle
27 Standing et aL (1996), p 143, in tum quoting J Bas'cin, 1994. Centralised Bargaining and COSA TU. Johannesburg:
NALEDI.. June.
2R 1>1011and Boccara (1996). p8
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Exemptions
The LRA introduced a system of exemptions at the discretion of the Industrial Council, that could
be granted if terms or conditions were not substantially less favourable than those prescribed in the
agreement. The Bargaining Council grants exemptions in question and as a general rule they are of
limited diration (usually one year) and are given only to a firm less than a certain size in existence
"less than four years. Moll and Boccara (1996)29 states that m the experience of most firms the
-ice of being exempted is so small that it is not worth applying. In 199411995, the industrial
cc.incils granted 4,315 complete exemptions and 153 partial exemptions, while turning down 389
applications (Standing et. al., 1996, p144). The total granted were 4,468, this comprises only 8
!""'cent of firms. 30 The system of exemptions has been widely criticized, on six grounds:"
1. The parties 10 an agreement who have vested interest in not granting exemptions decide on
exemptions;
2. Exemptions take a long time to process;
3. Exemptions granted are on an arbitrary basis;
4. Representations by applicants are not allowed;
5. Reasons for refusal are 11('It given;
6. Exemption procedures are complex.
The system of exemptions is perceived as not being efficient 1[1 addressing the problems created by
the extensions. Discussions with Confederation of Employers of Southern Africa (COFESA)32
revealed that in their experience in representing members in their applications for exemptions, the
exemption boards comprise both union representatives and representatives of the firms competitors.
The granting of the exemption will mean a loss of income to business, for the employer's
organization and the council as well as affiliation fees for the union since only union members may
work in these factories. In submitting applications for exemptions firms have to submit private and
confidential business information to their competition in businesses that sit on the board. COFESA
believes that these boards ignore the fundamental rights of administrative justice, free trade and
privacy.
29 Moll and Boccara (1996). p9
30 Moll and Boccara (1996). p9
31 Standing et al. (1996). p 143
3~ I had discussions with Mr H van der Walt who is the director if COFESA in March 1997,
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Effects and Costs
COFESA33 assists companies in dealing with industrial council regulation, and has to an extent been
involved in the push towards the use of contract labour in order to side-step the bargaining council
agreements. In dealing with bargaining councils they have found that the high level of wages for
new entrants is unrealistic and inhibits job creation. Some bargaining councils prescribe that the
wage of the entrant must increase at the completion of six months of service. In many cases
production has not increased and the person is still at the initial phase of the learning curve, costing
the company money in terms of training time and wasted materials.
The discussions with COFESA also revealed that bargaining councils have an effect on the costs of
labour for firms. The bargaining councils affect the cost structures of firms by increasing
administration costs such as pension contributions. In the view of COFESA the councils protect
their uneconorr.ical pension schemes, which are not supervised by the Registrar of the Department
of Finance. COFESA has found that the councils pretend that they exempt factories who can
provide better pension or provident funds, however, in practice it is impossible to prove that another
fund is better and the councils are the ultimate judge of eligibility. Firms are forced to match the
contributions of workers to the pension funds and this can be a sizable sum thus increasing the costs
of labour anr' the result of this is that firms hire fewer workers. The firms do not receive anything in
return for their contributions, however, when firms have a better alternative they are not allowed to
exercise it. Furthermore, COFESA believes that the bargaining councils affect the firm's ability to
function. This works through the stipulations regarding employment and the conditions of
employment. The stipulations result in the firm being inhibited in its ability to alter the size and
composition of its labour force. Thus firms would rather hire less permanent labour and when the
need arises use casual labour to fill in. This is because in times when demand for the firm's products
increase the firms need to hire more labour in order to increase output, however, they do not know
how long the increase will last. Now because the firm cannot easily retrench workers itwould rather
not take on more permanent workers in case the demand for its product decreases and it is burdened
with larger labour force tl -t it must now pay. Therefore the firm will employ a smaller permanent
labour force. The higher costs and stipulations about employment translate into lower levels of
permanent employment. The theories of chapter one did not address this dynamic of the bargaining
council system. The neo-classical model focused on the effect of direct labour costs and the
structuralist model on the productivity aspects of labour. The implications of this are that there are
aspects of the bargaining council system that are not explained by the theory and possibly not yet
understood.
33 I had diSCUSSIOnswith Mr H van der Walt who is the director if COFESA in March 1997.
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According to COFESA the bargaining councils prosecute more than 4 000 firms per year
(approximately 60% white and 40% black) in Gauteng alone for not registering or paying levies to
the councils. This is a form of "dirty tricks" in order to induce firms to comply with bargaining
council regulations. This jeopardizes the Growth Equity and Redistribution initiative of the
Department of Trade and Industry to create 400 000 job opportunities per year.
Conclusions
The debate surrounding industrial councils is focused on the issues of coverage, extensions and
exemptions and the differing interpretations as to the impact and effects of these phenomena. The
debate begins with the extent of coverage. The opponents have argued that coverage is relatively
large and extends beyond the mere number of employees and employers that are covered. However,
the issue of coverag- is not only confmed to those already present in an industry. For example the
threat of the formation of industrial councils is enough to deter investment into a particular industry.
An important implication is that the new LRA in supporting the bargaining council system will
extend the coverage of bargaining councils. This means that coverage will increase and therefore
the effects of the bargaining councils will be further exacerbated. It can therefore be expected that
the inefficiencies present in the labour market caused by extensions will worsen.
The issue of coverage leads directly into the issue of extensions. The argument of the proponents of
extensions is that they introduce stability, predictability and equity into the labour market.
Opponents to the system argue that the extensions raise the cost of labour and hence lead to
increased unemployment. They also lead to covered-uncovered sector wage differentials. It does
seem that the extensions are the case rather than the exception in the bargaining council system. For
example in 1994 69 out of 75 agreements were subject to extension. A further implication of the
new LRA is that there will be more agreements as other industries are brought into the bargaining
council system and most of them will be subject to extensions. This coupled with the increased
coverage suggests that the bargaining council system will have a far greater impact on the South
African Labour than it did in the past.
In response to the criticisms of the extensions proponents cite the existence of exemptions.
Opponents, however, believe that the system of exemptions is inefficient, biased and ineffectual. In
relation to the number of employers the number of exemptions granted is small, only eight percent.
When looking at the interplay between the three issues, coverage, extensions and exemptions the
above analysis suggests that the negative impact of the bargaining council system is going to get
worse. In my opinion this implies that there will be an increase in the level of unemployment as
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firms find it more difficult to operate. The models in chapter one substantiate this; especially the
neo-classical model coupled with the institutional aspects of the system highlighted in chapter two.
If the bargaining councils are in any way responsible for any level of unemployment as claimed by
Moll and COFESA then the strengthening l f their powers wiIllead to more unemployment.
Discussions with COFESA revealed that the bargaining councils have an effect on the cost
structures of firms and the firm's decision-making capacity. However, the effect does not work
through the wage setting mechanism, it works through the regulation of employment practices. The
regulations increase the costs for firms and constrain the firm's ability to adjust the size of its labour
force. The result of this is that firms employ fewer workers than they would if they were not
covered by the bargaining council agreements.
The final chapter presents the results from a survey that I conducted for the World Bank in the
beginning of 1997. The purpose of the survey was to answer questions related to coverage,
exemptions and extensions as well as to establish the degree of compliance with bargaining council
regulation. This last point is possibly the most important objective. This will give an indication of
whether t, ..0;; bargaining council regulations are binding.
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CHAPTER 4
SURVEY OF THE EFFECT OF BARGAINING COUNCILS REGULATIONS: A CASE
STUDY O:FTHE MOTOR INDUSTRY AND THE IRON, STEEL, ENGINEERING AND
METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY
Introduction
This chapter will present the results from a survey conducted by the World Bank in March 1997. It
has been argued that the regulation of wages and working conditions exercised by Bargaining
Councils tends to reduce employment, particularly at the small-finn end, where techniques are more
labour intensive and wages are lower. Interviews with some businesses and with business
associations have revealed that at least some businesses find be Bargaining Council regulation to
be a burden. From various sources (Bargaining Councils, the unions and interviews with some
firms) it is clear that compliance is virtually 100 percent among firms with significant union
representation. However, there is some debate as to the level of compliance among smaller non-
union firms, the fundamental purpose of the survey is to obtain a better understanding of the factors
that are associated with compliance.
the survey is for logistic reasons focused on two of the largest manufacturing SUb-sectors,namely:
The Motor Industry and the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry (or the Iron and
Steel Industry). The choice of these two sub-sectors relates to the governments wish to expand
employment and raise exports. These two have the capacity for both. Also they will provide a
contrast in respect of wage levels, one being a high-wage industry (Iron, Steel, Engineering and
Metallurgical Industry) and the other a low-wage industry (The Motor Industry). Both sub-sectors
have relatively high numbers of workers and employers: they are the two largest Bargaining
Councils in terms of the number of employees and number of firms covered.
Method
The survey apart from being limited to the two sub-sectors was also limited to two contrasting
regions. This was because there is some regional variation in the minimum wages prescribed by the
Bargaining Councils, and there may be differences in the degree of compliance across regions. The
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two regions were Witwatersrand (Wits), which is the most heavily populated region and the region
that contributes the largest share to GDP: and the Pietersburg, Nelspruit areas. The reason for
selecting these is that both the Bargaining Councils have two types of regions with differential
wages, and the objective was to choose area- that reflect this contrast. Iron, Steel, Engineering and
Metallurgical industry has the "urban" and "rural" category. Wits (including Potchefstroom and
Klerksdorp) is considered "urban" while Pietersburg and Nelspruit are considered "rural". The
Motor Industry has "A" and "B", Wits is considered "A" while Pietersburg and Nelspruit are
considered "B".
The sampling frame was obtained from the JT1 'mbership lists obtained from the Bargaining
Councils. The Bargaining Council staff extracted lists of all the firms with 110 or very low union
membership. The cut off percentage of unionization per firm was ten percent, however, due to
practical considerations this was revised lip to around thirty pe=enr This sample structure provides
the best test of compliance from the point of view that if amen ' lion and low-union firms it is
apparent that compliance is general then we can be relatively confident that the same is true of
partially and fully unionized firms as well.
From the lists we obtained from the Bargaining Councils, a random sample was taken and 60 firms
chosen from each list, 30 "urban" and 30 "rural". The first problem encountered was that for the
Motor Industry there were 36 "rural" firms registered, so the entire list was used. Of the firms
approached, 50 returns were obtained from the Iron and Steel and 24 from the motor industry
sample. The regional split was roughly even, in the Iron and Steel 54 percent' from the
Witwatersrand region and in the motor 46 percent from the Pietersburg/Nelspruit region, and from
the Motor industry 46 percent from the Witwatersrand and 54 percent from the
PietersburgiNelspruit region. From of the overall sample, 26 percent affirms were located in central
business districts, 57 percent in industrial parks, 16 percent in suburbs and only 1 percent from the
townships. The sample is limited to the main business areas in the respective regions. The limited
coverage of the townships is not problematic from the bargaining council's point of view as the
businesses concerned are very small and are unlikely to be registered. Their impact is seen as
minimal. This presents the problem of evasion. Small firms may be evading the bargaining councils
by choosing a location where they are unlikely to be discovered. Thus the bargaining councils may
be underestimating the number of firms in a particular industry and hence their coverage.
The sample is small and is not intended to provide definitive results r . there is the possibility that
it may not capture all the relevant information. Notwithstanding this, the results point to some
interesting and important findings.
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Results
With regards 0 production, 53 percent of the firms in the sample produced goods that are exported
or ultimately end up as a component of an export good. percent produce consumer goods and of
the goods aimed at consumers only 17 percent are luxunes. For the Motor industry 70 percent of the
urban firms produce for exports whereas only 31 percent of the rural firms produce for export. This
tendency is also seen as regards the Iron and Steel industry where 65 percent of "urban firms and
only 43 percent of rural firms produce for export. This would indicate that the export industry is
more concentrated in the urban areas such as the Witwatersrand.
Employer associations represent employers at the negotiations that take place within the Bargaining
Council forum. In the survey firms were asked if they were a member of an employer association.
For the Motor industry 67 percent of urban firms and 77 percent of rural firms were members,
however, for the Iron and Steel industry 76 percent of urban firms and only 39 percent of rural finns
were members. Overall membership in the sample is 65 percent. Thus it appears that in the Motor
industry membership of employer associations is equal in terms of regions, however, in the Iron and
Steel the rural areas are under represented relative to the urban areas. This can be inferred especially
from the rural sample as the sample covered close to 100 percent of registered firms in those areas.
The sample covered 6905 employees, of these 32 percent were rural based. Unionization in the
overall sample was 3 i percent. The rural areas had 35 percent (Motor) and 36 percent (Iron and
Steel) unionization, whereas the urban areas were lower with 29 percent for both industries. This
would seem to indicate the presence of unionization differentials of around 6 percent. In these two
industries there are separate rates for urban and rural wages.
Firms were asked whether they submitted monthly return's to the Bargaining Council. Of the firms
in the motor industry 91 percent submitted returns (83 percent rural anJ 100 percent urban) and of
the firms in the Iron and Steel industry 88 percent (87 percent rural and 89 percent urban) sub lit
returns. These returns contain information as regards wages, medical aid contributions, pension
contributions and any other pertinent information about the finn and its relationship with workers.
The high level of returns indicates that there is a high level of compliance to Bargaining Council
regulations. In discussions with Bargaining Council staff, if a finn does not submit returns then it is
automatically inspected and audited for any irregularities, if any are found this would lead to
litigatic n and ultimately cost the firm. Thus it is in the firm's interest (0 submit returns, however,
these returns enable the Bargaining Council to keep watch on the entire industry. It is from these
discussions and evidence from the survey that I can infer that regulations are binding.
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In terms ··jng the respective indistry, a question was asked about how many visits the firm
had rece ~cl' ] last 24 months. In the sample there were 97 inspections of 74 firms. This may
seem somewnat small, an average of less than one visit a year, However, this coupled with the
aspect of returns submitted as well as self policing through unions, other employers and employees
informing on each other, it appears that the regulations are binding and are relatively universally
applied in these two industries. The self-policing aspect arose from discussions with the bargaining
councils. The councils said that they needed relatively few inspectors as compared with the number
of firms in the respective industries. This is because employers, unions and workers report any firm
that they know is not complying with the bargaining council regulations. Thus the bargaming
councils see no need for numerous inspections as a result of this self-policing.
Exemptions
Exemptions are obtained from the respective Bargaining Councils on application. The granting of
an exemption means for the employer the relaxing of regulations such as minimum wage
regulations, working hours, pension/provident fund requirements and any other aspect of the
respective agreements. Of the firms in the sample 40 percent (jl percent of Iron and Steel, 61
percent in Motor) applied for exemptions, 58 percent (48 Nlc..;nt ofIron and Steel, 73 percent in
Motor) of those were granted fully and 11 percent (9 percent JfIron and Steel, 13 percent in Motor)
partially.
In the Motor industry none of the applications were for relief from paying the regulated minimum
wage, 54 percent were for the altering of working hours arrangements, 29 percent applied for
exemption from the council pension and provident fund arrangements and, 70 percent applied for
permission to have their own pension/provident fund. All except one firm still enjoy exemptions. In
the Iron and Steel industry 40 percent of the applications were for lower wages, 27 percent were for
the alteration of working hours, 33 percent for exemption from pension/provident funds and 25
percent were to have own pension/provident funds. Only 20 percent of these firms still enjoy
exemptions.
The firms that had not applied for exemptions were asked why they had not applied. In the Motor
industry 86 percent of firms said that the union would not pe.mit it and 78 percent said it would not
be worth it. Seventy eight percent said that they did not need one and all respondents said that the
wages they were paying is fair and that in paying lower wages they end up with lower quality
workers. All the firms also said that they felt that their application would be rejected so there was no
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point in applying. In the Iron and Steel industry, 79 percent they did not need it, 96 percent said that
the wage they were paying was fair with 85 percent believing that lower wages equals lower quality
employees. Seventy percent said that the unions would not permit the granting of exemptions and
78 percent said the effort would not be worth it and 75 percent believed that their application would
be rejected.
What is evident from the survey is that the conditions and procedures for exemption and the
perceptions of them are vastly different for the respective industries. It seems that in the Motor
industry it is easier to obtain an exemption than in the Iron and Steel industry. Considering that the
survey was directed at smaller firms and it is these firms that have the greatest chance of obtaining
an exemption under the conditions set out by the councils then it would appear that exemptions are
likely to be less for the larger firms. Also the issue of the number of exemptions cannot be
generalized across industries and different Bargaining Councils, rather one should look at the
respective criteria and procedures of each Bargaining Council.
The results suggest that as regards wages, most if not all firms felt that wages were not a hindrance,
rather that the wage being paid was fair. Furthermore, it was indicated that firms feel lower wages
result in lower quality workers. This seems to indicate that there is a premium on quality and hence
skill levels, i.e. they are prepared to pay higher wages for better quality workers, This issue was also
raised in interviews with firms and they said that there are queues of people trying to get a job,
however, they are unskilled anc in order to attract the right level of worker for a particular job, they
have to offer a higher wage.
Lastly, it became evident from discussic s with firms in the survey that the perception of the
Bargaining Councils is not a good one, Firms do not believe that their applications for exemptions
will be granted and a reason for this is that firms do not perceive the process of exemptions as fair.
They see it as a lottery due to a lack of consistency in the granting of exemptions and thus the time
and effort entailed in submitting an application is not worthwhile in terms of time and cost versus
benefit once the application has been granted.
Extensions
Firms were asked what they thought would happen to unskilled wage levels if the Bargaining
Council agreements were no longer extended to non-parties, 57 percent believed that wages would
hold steady, 43 percent thought wages would drop in some or most firms. When asked what would
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happen to employment, 81 percent believed that employment would rise if the agreements were no
longer extended. In the Motor industry 55 percent of urban firms and 92 percent of rural firms felt
that employment will rise if agreements are no longer extended to non-parties, in the Iron and Steel
industry 38 percent of urban and 81 percent of rural firms believe that employment will increase.
When asked by how much, most firrr-s believed it to be somewhere between 10 and 40 percent. In
terms of region, in the Motor industry 69 percent of rural firms believe wages will hold steady and
31 percent believe they will drop, whereas only 50 percent of urban firms believe wages will hold
steady with 40 percent believing they will drop. In the Iron and Steel industry 48 percent of rural
firms believe that wages will hold steady with 52 percent believing they will drop and 60 percent of
urbs.i firms feeling that wages will hold steady with 40 percent backing the fall in wages.
Finns were then asked as to whether they thought output would increase if bargaining council
agreements were no longer extended to non-parties? From the Motor industry 82 percent of urban
and 80 percent of rural firms believed that output would increase. In the Iron and Steel industry 83
percent of urban and 81 percent of rural firms believed output would increase. For the motor
industry 90 percent of firms sampled believed the increase would be between 10 and 40 percent and
in the Iron and Steel 74 percent also believed that the increase would be between 10 and 40 percent.
Firms were then asked what they would do if agreements were no longer extended to non-parties?
They were given the options of paying lower wages, changing working hours and changing
provident/pension funds. In this regard, 94 percent of the Motor industry indicated that they would
not lower wages or change working hours, 42 percent said they would change pension/provident
funds. In the Iron and Steel industry 90 percent said they would not lower wages, 74 percent said
they would not change working hours and only 33 percent would change pension/provident funds.
In order to establish the market for unskilled labour firms were asked if t'iey hire workers on a piece
rate. The results in both industries is identical, 87 percent said that they do not us piece rate
workers. When asked if the would convert to this if they were allowed to by the Bargaining
Council, 76 percent of the Motor industry and 64 percent of the Iron and Steel industry said they
would not. In terms of regions, in the Motor industrv 89 percent of urban firms and 67 percent rural
firms said they would not convert, however, in the lron and Steel industry 57 percent of urban firms
said they would convert while 86 percent of rural firms said they would not. Having established
this, firms were asked, if the firm could and it wanted t" convert to piece rate would it be able to
hire peopJe to work on this rate? In the Motor industry 89 percent of urban firms and only 54
percent of rural firms said that they would be able to hire workers under those conditions. In the
Iron and Steel Industry 71 percent of urban and 65 percent of rural firms said that they would be
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able to. This would seem to indicate that there is a greater supply of labour in the urban areas
relative to the rural areas.
Conclusion
Even though the survey is limited to the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry and the
Motor Industry, it yields some useful insights into the issue of compliance and impact of bargaining
councils. From the returns it appears that bargaining council regulations are binding and are
followed by the majority of firms in the respective industries. There does seem to be a difference
between urban and rural regions. The results of both industries in urban and rural regions are
commensurate exhibiting essentially the same trends.
As regards exemptions, the only clear result is that there is not a coherent manner in which they are
evaluated and granted. The types of application appear to be relevant for example, none of the firms
in the Motor Industry applied for relief from minimum wages whereas in the Iron and Steel Industry
40 percent of the applications were for minimum wage relief. On the other hand seventy five
percent of firms in the Motor Industry applied for permission to have their own pension/provident
funds whereas only 25 percent of the Iron and Steel industry had applied for the same. These
differences hint at the possible structural differences between the respective industries and the
actual functioning of the respective Bargaining Councils. However, there is not sufficient
information to ascertain which is the main cause.
An important implication that surfaces when firms refraining from application for exemptions were
asked why, almost all of the respondents believed that the wage that they are paying is fair and
hence do not need relief Furthermore, they believed that lower wages yielded lower quality
workers. This would suggest the existence of skill differentials and that a premium is paid for skills
and greater productivity. This indicates a shortfall in skill levels and an inherent lack of productivity
among the unemployed workers as well as the fact that existing workers are inflexible to wage cuts.
Most firms said that they could hire extra workers on a piece rate, however, there appears to be a
significant difference between urban and rural replies. 1I.10reurban empioyers indicated that they
could hire more workers than did rural employers. This would tentatively suggest that there is a
greater supply of workers in the urban setting. Notwithstanding this, the fact that most firms said
they could hire more labour points to a surplus of labour.
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In terms of the halting of extensions of agreements, except for the Iron and Steel Industry in the
rural area, the majority of firms believed wages would hold steady if extensions were no longer
allowed. The majority of firms also believed that employment and output would increase (mostly in
the 10 to 40 percent ranges) if the extensions were no longer in place.
Firms' are consistent in saying that the level of employment would increase if the extensions were
dropped but also that wages would hold steady. This alludes to the constraints that firm's face under
bargaining council regulations in terms of the amount of labour that they hire. Firms are constrained
in their ability to hire and fire workers by the bargaining council regulations, i.e. it is difficult for
firms to retrench workers when the finn no longer has the use for them. Thus the firm will hire less
workers than it otherwise would in case it falls on hard times and ends up with too big a labour
force that it has to pay every month. If the bargaining council agreements no longer existed then the
firm would easily be able to adjust to changing conditions and could employ the required number of
workers at all times. The implication of this result is that wages do not seem to be the issue in terms
of the number of workers employed rather it is the regulation of the conditions of employment as set
out in the bargaining council agreements. This is further corroborated when the firms say that the
wage they are paying is fair.
Applications by firms for permission to have their own pension/provident funds indicate that the
bargaining council pension/provident funds are a problem, especially in the Motor Industry. This
seems to substantiate the argument that the bargaining councils raise the administration costs of
firms, The reason for their applications is that the council's pension/provident funds are costing the
firm too much. Thus if the firms moved to their own pension/provident funds they could cut those
costs. This implicitly supports the argument that bargaining councils increase the administrative
costs of firms.
In sum, the main implications of this survey are that bargaining council extensions decrease the
level of employment and that the regulations are binding and are followed by firms in the industry.
Furthermore the results hint at aspects of the bargaining council system that have not been taken
into account by the theoretical models. In this regard the neo-classical model seems to be
misdirected in focusing mainly on the wage effects. The structuralist monel also neglects the above
features, although, the efficiency wage argument is pertinent in explaining the level of wages in
terms of skills and productivity. This implies that the firms must pay the current level of wages in
order to secure the required level of skills and productivity. Thus the level of wages does not impact
on the firms decision regarding the number of workers it employs. Rather it is the institutional
structure of the bargaining council system that introduces rigidities into the industry that impacts on
employment levels.
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CHAPTERS
CONCLUSIONS
The underlying objective of the industrial council system was the promotion of selectivity.
Although the kind of selectivity has changed, the underlying objective remains the same. It is the
promotion of interests of a select group namely, unions and employers that are party to the
negotiation of agreements. The parties' motivations may differ from each other but are entirely
consistent with the notion of selectivity. The unions seek to create a closed shop and the employers
want to create barriers to entry and reduce competition from other (normally smaller) firms. Given
the history of the industrial council system, it would be narve to think that renaming them and
increasing their powers would convert them into a useful labour market institution. It is true that
laoour markets practically never operate as efficiently as one would like. The point is to get the
labour market functioning as efficiently as possible, however, reliance on a system that is grounded
in apartheid is in my view incorrect. The bargaining council system that was created by the new
Labour Relations Act is not much different from the old system. The same people still hold the
same positions and the old biases are still evident. That is to say that the rent seeking behaviour of
the negotiating parties is still prevalent. Thus as a mechanism that has the purpose of protecting
certain groups such as union employees and big business, the bargaining councils are no different
from the old industrial councils.
Moll's first model l~rovides insight it.to how this works. The contention is that the larger more
capital intensive firms have higher costs especially on the labour side, as they need more skilled
labour. At present South Africa has a shortage of skilled labour and thus a premium is paid for
skills. The smaller firms teud to be more labour intensive and have lower labour costs. Through the
negotiations and formalizing of agreements the larger firms are able to affect the cost structure of all
firms in the industry. In effect the larger firms create a situation where they pay less wages than
they otherwise would have to and the smaller firms pay higher wages than they do. The important
aspect of this model is the distinction betw xn he cost structures oflarge and small firms.
The structuralist view is insightful in analyzing the conflict between labour and firms resulting from
their respective needs for security and flexibility. The structuralists believe that there is a trade-off
between them, i.e, for workers to have more security means that firms have less flexibility. The
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balance between them is achieved through negotiation within the bargaining council forum.
However, the .:!:1lcturalist view does not account for the abuse of the bargaining council system that
emanates from the old industrial council system. The structuralist approach, in opposition to the
neo-classical approach, focuses mainly on the effects of productivity with the argument that it is
unit labour costs that are important for the firm and not merely wage rates. This view argues that
wages and productivity as positively related and if there is a decrease in the wage level then
productivity will decline. The main implication of this view is the existence of efficiency wages.
These imply that a premium is being paid for skills and higher levels of productivity. Therefore if
bargaining council extensions were no longer enforced the wage levels would remain relatively the
same. This is corroborated in the survey when firms said that the wage they are paying is fair and
that if the extensions were no longer enforced, they would not lower the wage levels. Furthermore,
in discussions with firms in the survey it became evident that they had to pay higher wages in order
to attract workers with the required skill levels. Given this it appears that the neo-classical model is
incorrect in its contention that the effects of bargaining councils work through wages. However, the
neo-classical argument regarding different cost structures and the effect of bargaining councils on
thr- ....est srructures of smaller finns is correct. The structuralist approach in focusing only on unit
labour costs neglects the impacts of other costs and the regulation of the employment environment.
The results of the survey indicate that bargaining council regulations are binding and affect the
operations of employers. The results corroborate the argument that bargaining councils affect the
firms in two ways, firstly through the increase in administration costs such as cost of sending
returns to the council every month and contributions to pension funds. Secondly, through the
councils' effert on the decision-making capacity affirms. It is this second point that forms the basis
of the rigidity. Firms are bound by the extension of the agreements to follow procedures in the
hiring and firing of employees. These procedures make it extremely difficult for firms to alter the
size of their labour force. Ir other words, firms cannot easily reduce the size of their labour force
should the conditions within the industry dictate that they should. Knowing that they operate under
this constraint films employ a smaller permanent labour force and use part time labour if the need
arises. They do this to avoid the risk that they may find themselves in the situation where they are
paying for labour that they do not need. This means that the employment levels are below what they
would have been without the extensions. This phenomenon constitutes the rigidity.
Furthermore, administration C' -rts especially for the smaller firm's form a significant part of their
overall costs. Thus the level of these costs has a large impact on the firms profitability. These costs
can result in the firms employing less labour in order to cut costs and may even cause firms to close
down. These effects are greater in the case of the smaller firms as the larger firms find it much
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easier to internalize them. The effects of the rigidity are greater for the smaller firms than for the
larger firms especially those that take part in the negotiating process. One can infer this because the
larger firms that take part in the negotiations would not agree to those conditions if they adversely
affected their operations. However, the conditions do adversely effect other firms that were not
involved in the negotiations. Therefore the bargaining council system will not achieve equitable or
efficient outcomes in the labour market and will result in higher levels of unemployment.
The argument of this paper that bargaining councils do increase unemployment has important
implications for the South African labour market. The new LRA strengthens the powers of the
bargaining councils and promotes their formation in industries where they do not already exist.
Thus it appears that the bargaining council system is here for the foreseeable future. The expansion
of the bargaining council system in terms of this paper suggests that unemployment is likely to
increase and the goals of equity in the labour market are not likely to be achieved. Furthermore, the
system is unlikely to increase the levels of training and education in the labour market while the
bargaining council agreements constrict the firm's ability to make decisions about its labour
component. South Africa is under pressure from international competition both for domestic and
international markets, however, the constraints placed on firms will mean that they become less
competitive in the international market place. This in turn has severe negative implications for
growth and development, namely that growth will not reach its full potential and in turn this will
hamper development. Thus the government's GEAR program will be placed in jeopardy.
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